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Reconceiving Resilience: A New Guiding Principle 
for Financial Regulation? 
Mary Dowell-Jones∗ & Ross Buckley** 
Abstract: Most postcrisis financial regulation is expressed to be in the pursuit of 
increasing the resilience of the global financial system. “Resilience” features in 
the formal title of the Basel III reforms to bank capital adequacy rules. This article 
explores the meaning of resilience from social-ecological systems science and 
applies it to international finance. We conclude that postcrisis financial 
regulation has in fact sought to build a stronger, more robust system, not a more 
resilient one. The regulation imposed on global systemically important financial 
institutions is designed to make these institutions too strong to fail, not give them 
the capacity to reorganize themselves, or transition to a new equilibrium, in the 
face of major external shocks. This article challenges the fundamental thinking 
behind seven years of postcrisis financial regulation and suggests we need far 
more rigorous research into what a truly resilient international financial system 
would look like and how it would be regulated. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Resilience is broadly defined as “the capacity of a system to avoid 
disturbance and reorganize while undergoing change so as to still retain 
essentially the same function, structure, identity, and feedbacks.”1 It is a 
concept with a multidisciplinary pedigree with roots in ecology, security 
analysis and childhood trauma, among others, and which focuses on the 
dynamic capacity of a complex, adaptive, nonlinear system to self-repair in 
response to stress or to transition to a new stable equilibrium, rather than the 
capacity of a system to function without succumbing to crisis in the first 
place. It is therefore a useful concept to apply to finance because of the 
tendency of the globally integrated financial system to swing from one crisis 
to another,2 and it is a term that has come to feature heavily in postcrisis 
debates about financial stability.3 In light of the scale of the global financial 
crisis of 2008 and the bailouts required to save the system, resilience is seen 
as a highly desirable attribute of today’s integrated global markets and an 
objective of postcrisis regulatory reforms. 
However, as a broad, multidisciplinary concept, it is not unproblematic 
in its application to finance because it does not immediately offer a practical, 
concrete agenda for reform specific to the financial markets. Resilience, as it 
is applied in disciplines like ecology, for example, is generally a descriptive 
rather than normative attribute of a system, i.e. undesirable systems can be 
characterized as resilient because they also have the capacity to endure in the 
face of shocks. To understand resilience, the key structural attributes of a 
 
 1  Brian H. Walker, C. S. Holling, Stephen R. Carpenter & Ann Kinzig, Resilience, Adaptability and 
Transformability in Social-Ecological Systems, 9(2) ECOL. SOC. 5 (2004). 
 2  When the crises that have been produced by the financial markets over the last quarter of a century 
are listed, it is immediately striking that the periods without crises are by far the rarer creature: Eurozone 
crisis (2010–); Global Financial Crisis (2007–2009); Global Food & Fuel Crisis (2005–2008) (although 
this is not counted as a financial market crisis proper, it resulted from the global asset boom & increased 
trading in agricultural commodities, and it had a very serious impact on the world’s poorest people); 
Dotcom Crisis/Argentina (2001–2003); Russia/Latin America (1998–1999); LTCM (1998); Asian 
Financial Crisis (1997–1998); Bond Market Crisis (1994); European ERM Crisis (1992–1993); Stock 
Market Crash (1987). CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER & ROBERT Z. ALIBER, MANIAS, PANICS AND 
CRASHES: A HISTORY OF FINANCIAL CRISES (6th ed. 2011); CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. 
ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY (2009); ROSS P. BUCKLEY & 
DOUGLAS W. ARNER, FROM CRISIS TO CRISIS: THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND REGULATORY 
FAILURE (2011). 
 3  See, e.g., BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, 
CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT: STRENGTHENING THE RESILIENCE OF THE BANKING SECTOR (2009); BANK 
OF ENG., FINANCIAL STABILITY REPORT: BUILDING A MORE RESILIENT FINANCIAL SYSTEM 36–57 (JUNE 
2009); FIN. STABILITY FORUM, REPORT OF THE FINANCIAL STABILITY FORUM ON ENHANCING MARKET 
AND INSTITUTIONAL RESILIENCE (Apr., 2008); Mario Draghi, President, European Cent. Bank, Speech at 
the 2013 International Monetary Conference: Strengthening Financial Resilience (June 3, 2013), 
http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2013/html/sp130603.en.html. 
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system and its essential dynamics, interdependencies and feedback loops 
need to be mapped. However, the complexity and lack of transparency of 
today’s global financial markets make this exceptionally difficult. Where the 
term resilience is used in regulatory debates, it often indicates a generally 
desired condition of systemic stability which is assumed to flow from the 
proposed regulatory measures. It is not generally used to denote a particular 
approach to understanding the dynamics of global finance and the required 
management/regulatory responses for achieving stability. Thus, resilience is 
used in a generic, descriptive manner rather than as the organizing goal of a 
new regulatory approach. While there is wide-ranging stakeholder agreement 
on the value of increased financial system resilience, resilience does not in 
and of itself offer an immediate agenda for reform, and despite the frequent 
use of the term in regulatory debate, no one really knows whether the 
postcrisis regulatory changes will have this effect. 
Our purpose is to review certain key characteristics of resilience as it 
has been applied in social-ecological systems science (SES) where the 
concept first emerged, and to analyze whether they offer insights into the 
better management of financial systems, particularly the global financial 
system. Applying SES resilience thinking to finance raises acute questions 
around our understanding of financial systems as systems, and their key 
dynamics, risk factors and stability determinants; and raises the fundamental 
issue of whether we understand the financial system sufficiently well to even 
be able to develop a regulatory agenda for resilience. 
 II. RECOGNIZING RESILIENCE – WILL WE KNOW IT WHEN 
WE SEE IT? 
One of the problems with applying the concept of resilience to the 
international financial system is that it is not clear that we will know it when 
we see it. Nor is it self-evident that the concept provides a specific roadmap 
for change. Resilience has become a “pervasive idiom of global governance”4 
that: 
has in the recent past rapidly infiltrated vast areas of the social 
sciences, becoming a regular, if under-theorized, term of art in 
discussions of international finance and economic policy, corporate 
risk analysis, the psychology of trauma, development policy, urban 
planning, public health and national security.5 
 
 4  Jeremy Walker & Melinda Cooper, Genealogies of Resilience: From Systems Ecology to the 
Political Economy of Crisis Adaptation, 42(2) SECURITY DIALOGUE 143, 143 (2011). 
 5  Id. 
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As should be expected of a concept that can be applied so broadly across 
disciplines, its inherent malleability fosters its multidisciplinary uptake, but 
the challenges in reconfiguring the international financial architecture mean 
it can only provide broad principles of thought. 
Perhaps the biggest problem with the concept of resilience is that it can 
easily be mistaken for something else. Most commonly, it has been mistaken 
for interludes of market calm between crises. It is also called in aid to justify 
the apparent success of new financial products, ideas and reforms, before 
they have had time to cause harm. 
In 2005, the Director of the IMF’s International Capital Markets 
Department stated that “For four straight years the global financial system 
has shown impressive resilience.”6 
In 2005, Alan Greenspan remarked that “[t]he use of a growing array of 
derivatives and the related application of more-sophisticated approaches to 
measuring and managing risk are key factors underpinning the greater 
resilience of our largest financial institutions . . . .”7 
In 2006, the IMF asserted that “the dispersion of credit risk by banks to 
a broader and more diverse group of investors, rather than warehousing such 
risk on their balance sheets, has helped to make the banking and overall 
financial system more resilient.”8 
In August 2007, the Governor of the Bank of England, Mervyn King 
stated: 
[I]t is very important to set a very, very key point here, which is that 
our banking system is much more resilient than in the past. Precisely 
because many of these risks are no longer on their balance sheets but 
have been sold off to people willing and probably more able to bear 
it.9 
One month later, the Bank of England was dealing with the first run on 
a British bank in over one hundred years.10 
Despite these errors in recognizing resilience, the idea of resilience has 
 
 6  Gerd Häusler, Why the Global Financial System is More Resilient, INT’L MONETARY FUND: VIEWS 
& COMMENTARIES (Oct. 7, 2005), http://www.imf.org/external/np/vc/2005/100705e.htm.  
 7  Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Remarks delivered to the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago Conference on Bank Structure: Risk Transfer and Financial Stability 
(May 5, 2005), http://www.federalreserve.gov/Boarddocs/Speeches/2005/20050505.  
 8  IMF, Market Developments and Issues, Global Financial Stability Report, at 51 (Apr. 2006). 
 9  Bank of Eng., Inflation Report Press Conference (Aug. 8, 2007), http://www.bankofengland.co.uk 
/publications/Documents/inflationreport/conf080807.pdf. 
 10  Although there had been bank collapses such as Barings in 1995, a run on the retail deposits of a 
British bank had not occurred since Victorian times. In 1866, a run on deposits was triggered by the 
collapse of Overend, Gurney & Co., and in 1878 by the collapse of the City of Glasgow Bank. TREASURY 
COMMITTEE, THE RUN ON THE ROCK, 2007-8, HC 56-I, at 8–9 (UK). 
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become ubiquitous in regulatory debates. As the Bank of England remarked 
in its 2009 Financial Stability Report chapter titled “Building a more resilient 
financial system”: 
The financial system should be capable of absorbing shocks from the 
economy and from financial markets rather than generating them. It 
also needs to be much better able to support economic activity on a 
sustainable basis, without relying on large-scale publicly funded 
support to weather shocks. This will require fundamental changes to 
the way the financial sector is regulated, supervised and manages its 
own affairs.11 
The Basel III international capital adequacy regulations which emerged 
out of the crisis are formally titled “A Global Regulatory Framework for 
More Resilient Banks and Banking Systems,” and their overarching objective 
is “to improve the banking sector’s ability to absorb shocks arising from 
financial and economic stress, whatever the source, thus reducing the risk of 
spillover from the financial sector to the real economy.”12 This conceives of 
resilience of the financial system as separate and distinct from the resilience 
of the broader economy or society, as if the one can be defined in isolation 
from the other. The fact that regulators in various jurisdictions have chosen 
to adopt higher capital requirements than those mandated in these regulations 
indicates in any case less than full consensus on the framework’s ability to 
achieve the desired financial stability and resilience outcomes.13 The Basel 
III framework establishes a soft law set of minimum standards for the global 
banking system, with national regulators free to go beyond the minimum. In 
practice, “most jurisdictions have adopted minimum requirements that 
exceed the global standard,” which has been labelled as “super-
equivalence.”14 
 
 11  BANK OF ENG., supra note 3, at 36. 
 12  BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, BASEL III: A GLOBAL 
REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR MORE RESILIENT BANKS AND BANKING SYSTEMS 1 (2011), 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf. 
 13  See IMF, Australia: Addressing Systemic Risk Through Higher Loss Absorbency — Technical 
Note, at 10 tbl. 4, Country Report No. 12/311 (Nov. 2012); KPMG, Basel 4 – Emerging from the Mist?, 
KPMG: INSIGHTS (Sep. 4, 2013), https://home.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/pdf/2013/09/emerging-
from-the-mist.pdf; ANAD ADMATI & MARTIN HELLWIG, THE BANKERS’ NEW CLOTHES: WHAT’S WRONG 
WITH BANKING AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2013); Ross P. Buckley, Rolf H. Weber & Mary Dowell-
Jones, A Swiss Finish for Australia? Approaches to Enhancing the Resilience of Systemically Important 
Banks, 10(1) CAP. MKT. L.J. 41 (2015). 
 14  Stefan Ingves, Chairman, Basel Comm. on Banking Supervision, Governor, Sveriges Riksbank, 
Keynote Speech at the Meeting for the Americas, Lima, Peru: Basel III Implementation: Progress, Pitfalls 
and Prospects (Nov. 5, 2014), http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp141105.htm; see also BASEL COMM. ON 
BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, IMPLEMENTATION OF BASEL STANDARDS: A 
REPORT TO G20 LEADERS ON IMPLEMENTATION OF THE BASEL III REGULATORY REFORMS (Nov. 2014), 
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The Financial Stability Forum, precursor to the Financial Stability 
Board, also adopted a resilience framework for its reform agenda, without 
specifying how it defined resilience or what a resilient financial system 
should look like. The schedule of measures that it proposed responded to the 
particular failures identified during the crisis, rather than setting out a new 
vision for the financial system. The stated goal was “to strengthen the 
efficiency and resilience of the system, without hindering the processes of 
market discipline and innovation that are essential to the financial system’s 
contribution to economic growth.”15 Notwithstanding that recent 
“innovation” had caused systemic meltdown, this implied that the system and 
the ideas on which it was built were fundamentally sound, but that action was 
needed on the specific failures that led to the crisis. This is an approach which 
has been continued by its successor the Financial Stability Board. In his letter 
to the G20 summit in Brisbane, Mark Carney, the Chair of the Financial 
Stability Board, declared, “Strengthened international standards are building 
more resilient financial institutions and more robust markets.” He noted that 
the G20 had “worked intensively . . . to correct the fault lines that led to the 
global financial crisis.”16 
Another example of the postcrisis use of resilience in financial 
regulatory debates is provided by a speech in 2011 by González-Páramo, 
member of the Executive Board of the European Central Bank.17 The speech 
uses resilience or resilient twelve times, and yet fails to provide any 
indication of what is meant by a resilient financial system. It is assumed that 
this is an objective that requires no further explanation. González-Páramo 
states “Why is the resilience of the financial system so important? The 
financial system is the lifeblood of the real economy. It touches all facets of 
our economy from households to corporations and even governments.” He 
then focuses on the need for “a resilient risk management framework for the 
future” resting on “the twin pillars of statistical risk models and stress 
testing,” even though this is precisely the architecture of risk management 
 
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d299.pdf. 
 15  FIN. STABILITY FORUM, REPORT OF THE FINANCIAL STABILITY FORUM ON ENHANCING MARKET 
AND INSTITUTIONAL RESILIENCE, 2 (Apr. 2008), http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/ 
r_0804.pdf?page_moved=1. 
 16  Letter from Mark Carney, Chair, Financial Stability Board, Governor, Bank of Eng., to G20 
Leaders 1, 5 (Nov. 7, 2014), http://www.fsb.org/wp-content/uploads/FSB-Chair’s-Letter-to-G20-
Leaders-on-Financial-Reforms-Completing-the-Job-and-Looking-Ahead.pdf; See also Building Resilient 
Financial Institutions, FINANCIAL STABILITY BOARD, www.financialstabilityboard.org/what-we-
do/policy-development/building-resilience-of-financial-institutions. 
 17  José Manuel González-Páramo, Member, Executive Board of the European Central Bank, Speech 
delivered at the 3rd Annual Risk and Return Russia Conference: Risk, Return, Resilience: The Future 
Financial System (Apr. 14, 2011), http://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2011/html/ 
sp110414.en.html. 
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which failed so spectacularly in the run up to and during the crisis. 
Resilience, then, appears to be generally used as a broad descriptive 
term for the goal of measures which regulators have decided upon, rather 
than a new paradigm for financial stability from which to build. As one 
commentator has noted, “current efforts to rebuild and reshape the financial 
system fail to engage in depth the necessary preliminary questions about what 
resilience might mean and who should be the subject of resilience-building 
measures.”18 They are heavily, if not exclusively, focused on the resilience 
of the financial system alone, as if that can be defined in isolation from the 
way the financial system interacts with broader economic and socio-political 
institutions. If financiers and regulators with decades of experience in the 
international financial and monetary system cannot correctly identify market 
resilience, and instead mistake precrisis symptoms for it, even as these are 
reaching a critical stage, how useful is the concept as a broad policy tool? 
Does the notion of resilience inject a new dynamic in the regulatory 
endeavor, or is it merely a generic term for financial stability? 
 III. UNDERSTANDING THE CONCEPT OF RESILIENCE 
As a starting point, it is increasingly recognized that the financial system 
is a complex, nonlinear system19 like the social-ecological system, and is 
therefore akin to a “financial ecosystem.”20 One of the key issues in defining 
an agenda for a resilient financial system is to understand the nature, 
structure, and key characteristics of the financial system. Given the scale, 
complexity and rapid growth of financial markets, this is not self-evident, as 
the system has fundamentally changed over the last two decades. During the 
crisis it became apparent that regulators and financial institutions had simply 
failed to understand the changes that had taken place in the financial system 
over the years leading up to the crisis, and did not recognize transmission 
mechanisms and interconnections between firms and markets and between 
the financial system as a whole and the broader economy.21 Without a deep 
 
 18  Joanna Gray, Toward a More Resilient Financial System?, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 799, 802 (2013). 
 19  See, e.g., Andrew G. Haldane, Executive Director of Financial Stability, Bank of England, Speech 
delivered at the Financial Student Association, Amsterdam: Rethinking the Financial Network (Apr. 28, 
2009), http://www.bis.org/review/r090505e.pdf; John Kambhu, Scott Weidman & Neel Krishnan, New 
Directions for Understanding Systemic Risk: A Report on a Conference Cosponsored by the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York and the National Academy of Sciences, 13(2) NYFR ECON. POL. REV. 83 
(2007). 
 20  See generally Andrew G. Haldane & Robert M. May, Systemic Risk in Banking Ecosystems, 469 
NATURE 351 (2011); Robert M. May, Simon A. Levin & George Sugihara, Ecology for Bankers, 451 
NATURE 893, 893–95 (2008). 
 21  FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE 
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED 
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understanding of the nature of the system and the way it evolves in relation 
with other interlocking systems such as economic, political, social and 
ecological systems, it is impossible to determine an agenda for building 
financial resilience.22 Analyzing the dynamics of resilience in the social-
ecological domain and applying them within the context of financial markets 
should enable the construction of an agenda for building resilience in 
financial systems. 
 A. Resilience as a paradigm shift 
Resilience theory emerged in ecology debates during the 1970s as an 
attempt to analyze the capacity of ecological systems to resist disturbance in 
the face of shocks.23 It drew on complex adaptive systems theory and second-
order quantum cybernetics to move thinking away from the model of 
classical equilibrium that had until then predominated in scientific thinking. 
The classic model had focused on the idea of a “balance of nature” or a 
steady, stable state in ecology which did not accommodate the reality of 
constant, dynamic, and random change within a system which permitted 
adaptive responses to disturbance.24 The shift in thinking was largely a 
response to scientific approaches to natural resource management that had 
focused on quantitative metrics of producing the maximum yield from an 
ecosystem, based on the idea of a simple, steady state equilibrium to which a 
natural system would tend to revert after a shock. This approach had 
downplayed and underestimated the importance of complex networks of 
interdependencies within the system and was argued to be fundamentally 
destabilizing to an ecosystem.25 The emphasis of this management approach 
on stressing the ecosystem to produce the maximum yield weakened the 
system by reducing the fundamental diversity which supports its capacity to 
absorb shocks. Because this approach fundamentally misunderstood the 
complex, adaptive nature of an ecosystem and the function of diversity, and 
assumed linear, stable relationships between various aspects of the system, it 
led to monocropping, overexploitation, and the loss of the diversity essential 
 
STATES (2011). 
 22  May, Levin & Sugihara, supra note 20, at 894 (“[T]he dynamical implications of the topology of 
financial networks emerge as good candidates for further research.”); see also Haldane & May, supra note 
20. 
 23 See C. S. Holling, Resilience and Stability of Ecological Systems, 4 ANN. REV. OF ECOLOGY & 
SYSTEMATICS 1 (1973), which was a seminal paper in this regard. 
 24  JOHN KIRCHNER, THE BALANCE OF NATURE: ECOLOGY’S ENDURING MYTH (2009). 
 25  Walker & Cooper, supra note 4, at 146 (“[T]he long-term expectation of stability may be inherently 
destabilizing. When managed with the expectation of a permanent and fixed yield, the complex 
interconnections supporting the resilience of the ecosystem as a whole may become undetectably fragile, 
undermining its productivity.”). 
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to system survival.26 
One example of the damage done by this approach is provided by 
scientific forestry. To maximize the return on commercial forestry, a new 
“science” of forest management emerged in Germany during the nineteenth 
century. In place of the old, messy, mixed forests, German state planners 
envisaged and planted uniform rows of single-species forests so as to produce 
the maximum useable commercial timber harvest.27 Every aspect of the forest 
was assessed to gauge its economic, utilitarian value, which led to many 
subtle processes and flora being discounted as worthless.28 While the first 
crop was a huge success which produced vastly more timber than the old 
forests, returns declined steeply thereafter because the scientific plan to 
simplify the forest and produce a maximum yield had failed to understand 
the dynamic importance of the diversity of the old forest to systemic 
resilience.29 
A new word, Waldsterben (meaning “forest death”) even entered the 
German language to describe the results of such forestry monocrops, which 
starkly demonstrated “the dangers of dismembering an exceptionally 
complex and poorly understood set of relations and processes in order to 
isolate a single element of instrumental value.”30 
This experience parallels the more recent one of credit derivatives and 
the housing market and illustrates the relevance of ecological resilience ideas 
for the financial ecosystem. In order to securitize thousands of home loans 
into structured products, the complex dynamic of relationships, both 
financial and personal, that comprise a housing market were reduced to a 
simple concept of “credit risk.”31 This was itself simplified by using a proxy 
 
 26  Holling, supra note 23, at 21 (The very approach . . . that assures a stable maximum sustained yield 
of a renewable resource might so change these deterministic conditions that the resilience is lost or reduced 
so that a chance and rare event that previously could be absorbed can trigger a sudden dramatic change 
and loss of structural integrity of the system.). 
 27  JAMES C. SCOTT, SEEING LIKE A STATE: HOW CERTAIN SCHEMES TO IMPROVE THE HUMAN 
CONDITION HAVE FAILED 15 (1998). 
 28  Id. 
 29  Id. at 20 (“An exceptionally complex process involving soil building, nutrient uptake, and 
symbiotic relations among fungi, insects, mammals, and flora – which were, and still are, not entirely 
understood – was apparently disrupted, with serious consequences. Most of these consequences can be 
traced to the radical simplicity of the scientific forest.”); see also Holling, supra note 23, at 11–22 for a 
description of scientific forestry. 
 30  Holling, supra note 23, at 21. 
 31  Stan J. Liebowitz, Anatomy of a Train Wreck: Causes of the Mortgage Market Meltdown, in 
HOUSING AMERICA: BUILDING OUT OF A CRISIS (B. Powell & R. Halcomb eds., 2009); see also David 
Greenlaw et al., LEVERAGED LOSSES: LESSONS FROM THE MORTGAGE MARKET MELTDOWN, 
PROCEEDINGS OF THE US MONETARY POLICY FORUM 2008, THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO BOOTH 
SCHOOL OF BUSINESS, 2008; see SCOTT, supra note 27, at 103–46 for an analysis of the social complexity 
of residential space; RICHARD SENNETT, THE CONSCIENCE OF THE EYE: THE DESIGN AND SOCIAL LIFE 
OF CITIES (1990). 
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(life insurance survivorship rates) to create a homogenized product: 
Residential Mortgage Backed Securities (RMBS).32 These could then be 
widely commercialized so as to produce the maximum financial yield from 
the underlying resource. Once the availability of RMBSs collided with 
conducive conditions in the international financial markets, it led to financial 
monocropping. In doing so, the complex, “scientific” mathematics of credit 
risk modelling and credit derivatives massively oversimplified and 
misunderstood the diverse range of relationships that drive a nation’s demand 
for housing credit and the complex interdependencies that ensure its 
resilience, by focusing on mortgage repayment probabilities and correlated 
default rates, assessed through statistical abstractions and historical data. As 
the head of asset-backed finance at Moody’s told a New York Times 
interviewer: “We aren’t loan officers . . . our expertise is as statisticians on 
an aggregate basis.”33 Finance became blind to the subtle network of systems 
and social processes of which it was only one part and on which it depended. 
Underlying the apparent success of credit derivatives and the risk 
transference they enabled in the short run, processes were set in motion by 
the application of this financial monocropping culture which restructured the 
subtle dynamics of the system and ignored those aspects which were of no 
commercial value, or difficult to program into their models. The range of 
economic and social dependencies that typify a housing market, which are 
largely locality specific, were then subsumed within broad-based 
financialization.34 Although the initial result was a massive increase in 
profitability for entities involved in structuring asset-backed securities, the 
end result was the near collapse of the banking system. A process that 
transformed mortgage finance — one of the oldest of banking products — 
into a “scientific,” top-down mortgage system designed to enhance financial 
returns nearly destroyed the entire financial system. Of course, the credit 
crisis was driven by a multitude of factors,35 of which credit derivatives were 
 
 32  See generally David X. Li, On Default Correlation: A Copula Function Approach, 9(4) J. FIXED 
INCOME 43 (2000) (showing that modelling the correlation of defaults in a mortgage market was one of 
the key issues in managing the credit risk, that the author’s work on solving this problem led the way to 
the massive growth in mortgage-backed securities, and that the failure of the models was central to the 
credit crisis); see also Philippe Jorion & Gaiyan Zhang, Credit Contagion from Counterparty Risk, 64(5) 
J. FIN. 2053 (2009) for an analysis of credit model fragility in estimated default correlations for specific 
obligors. 
 33  Roger Lowenstein, Triple-A Failure, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 27, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2008/04/27/magazine/27Credit-t.html?ex=1366603200&en=aa00d5988f95645f&ei=5088&partner= 
rssnyt&emc=rss; see also Phillipe Jorion, Risk Management Lessons from the Credit Crisis, 15(5) EUR. 
FIN. MGMT. 923 (2009); Jón Daníelsson, Blame the Models, 4(4) J. FIN. STABILITY 321 (2008). 
 34  Craig Burnside, Martin Eichenbaum & Sergio Rebelo, Understanding Booms and Busts in 
Housing Markets (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16734, 2011). 
 35  Of the many factors that contributed to the subprime meltdown, one was a desire on the part of 
U.S. policymakers to make housing finance more available to low-income borrowers, which led to banks 
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only one, but in terms of the particular dynamics of the housing market and 
ideas about ecological resilience, the immediate parallels with the 
monocropping of ecosystems are striking. 
The end result of the process was that banks had reduced their own 
resilience by homogenizing their portfolios and loading up on a 
commercialized, standardized product with seeming mathematical 
justification, without regard to the basic health of the underlying ecosystem/
asset base.36 This was compounded by the narrow specialization of financial 
roles and the segmentation of the credit process within financial institutions, 
which removed the incentive for a system-wide perspective. The guiding 
logic of securitization focused on maximizing efficiency and economic 
output through risk transfer, without regard to possible entropy in the system 
as risk was transferred through the layers of the securitization process.37 The 
need to maintain the subtle socio-economic dynamics that supported 
resilience was overlooked. As Andy Haldane has commented, “[F]inancial 
sector balance sheets became homogenised. Finance became a monoculture. 
In consequence, the financial system became, like plants, animals and the 
ocean before it, less disease-resistant. When environmental factors changed 
for the worse, the homogeneity of the financial eco-system increased 
materially its probability of collapse.”38 
This underlines the importance of understanding the complex nature of 
the financial system and the interlocking nature of codependent systems 
(financial-economic-social) as part of resilience thinking in finance. It also 
suggests the importance of subtle, nonfinancial processes for building and 
maintaining resilience—that a quest to isolate and maximize financial value 
may fundamentally reduce systemic resilience by weakening the underlying 
processes on which the financial system depends. The quest to maximize 
financial yield cannot be pursued on the assumption that the processes it sets 
in motion simultaneously maximize efficiency, human welfare, and systemic 
resilience. This calls into question the Financial Stability Forum’s 
 
seeking new ways of managing and profiting from the increased credit risk on their books. 
 36  This comes through very clearly in accounts of the crisis, as banks/investors relied entirely on 
credit ratings and the outputs of risk models, without performing basic checks on the reality of the 
underlying housing market. See, e.g., UBS, Shareholder Report on UBS’s Write-Downs, UBS ANNUAL 
GENERAL MEETING 2008, 38–41 (Apr. 18, 2008), www.ubs.com/global/en/about_ubs/ 
investor_relations/agm/previous-agms/2008/agm2008/invagenda.html.  
 37  Entropy is a central feature of ecological interdependencies: it refers to the rate of energy loss as 
energy is passed through food webs and ecological systems. In contrast, theories of risk assumed that risk 
could be dissected, disassembled, and reassembled along the chain of intermediation without any “energy 
loss” or rate of dissipation. Entropy is an interesting idea to apply to finance and risk. See Kambhu, 
Weidman & Krishnan, supra note 19, at 25; Rongzi Zhou, Ru Cai & Guanqun Tong, Applications of 
Entropy in Finance: A Review, 15 ENTROPY 4909, 4909–31 (2013). 
 38  Haldane, supra note 19, at 19. 
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juxtaposition of financial system resilience, efficiency, and innovation as 
“essential to the financial system’s contribution to economic growth.”39 It 
also calls into question the focus of the Financial Stability Board on “fixing 
the fault lines that underlay the crisis” by addressing a range of narrowly 
financial issues: bank capital, shadow banking, more transparent derivatives 
markets, and ending too-big-to-fail (TBTF) through coherent resolution 
mechanisms.40 This approach assumes the characteristics of the system that 
plunged the world into severe crisis are fundamentally sound, and it suggests 
creating a resilient financial system simply requires fixing the defects that led 
directly to the crisis. 
 IV. IDENTIFYING CHARACTERISTICS OF RESILIENT 
SYSTEMS 
 A. Panarchy 
In response to the problems of overexploitation of the natural 
environment, ecological resilience thinking moved away from a focus on 
classical equilibrium, to one of panarchy, or multiple equilibria through 
which a system can transition. Panarchy has been defined as “[t]he interactive 
dynamics of a nested set of adaptive cycles,”41 and it broadly refers to the 
concept that a complex ecosystem has multiple potential points of 
equilibrium, balanced across actors operating at multiple spatial and temporal 
scales, and may never in fact be at a point of optimal equilibrium.42 
A resilient ecosystem is one characterized by constant mutation at 
different interlocking levels, from the fast change among microorganisms to 
slower change at the level of regional ecosystems to the geological scale over 
many millennia. All scales have the capacity to affect change at surrounding 
levels, and attempts to manage for stability at one scale can have unintended 
consequences at other scales. So for example, the attempt to manage forestry 
for the life-cycle of trees affected the life-cycle of microorganisms which in 
turn affected the slower process of gradual nutrient building in the soil which 
supported successive populations of trees. Undermining these processes 
altered the ability of the forest to regenerate and led to the failure of the 
scientific approach to forestry. Similarly with credit derivatives, the financial 
 
 39  FIN. STABILITY FORUM, supra note 15, at 2. 
 40  Carney, supra note 16, at 3. 
 41  Carl Folke et al., Resilience Thinking: Integrating Resilience, Adaptability and Transformability, 
15 ECOLOGY & SOC’Y, no. 4, 2010, at 1, 3; see also, PANARCHY: UNDERSTANDING TRANSFORMATIONS 
IN HUMAN AND NATURAL SYSTEMS 5 (Lance H. Gunderson & C.S. Holling eds., 2002). 
 42  See Robert V. O’Neill, Recovery in Complex Ecosystems, 6 J. AQUATIC ECOSYSTEMS STRESS & 
RECOVERY 181, 184 (1999). 
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system became deeply unstable because financial objectives and returns were 
seen as an end in themselves. Little attention was paid to the broader impacts 
on social and economic processes of the boom in mortgage finance as 
financial profitability was taken as a proxy for increasing general welfare. 
Applying panarchy thinking to finance makes it clear that the resilience of a 
financial system cannot be viewed simply as the resilience of financial 
institutions; it is a much broader concept which draws on the deep 
interconnections across social, political, economic, and ecological systems. 
Furthermore, the resilience of a financial system cannot be understood 
without understanding how it interacts with systems at higher and lower 
scales. For instance, the resilience of East Asia’s financial system cannot be 
understood without an appreciation of its interactions with the global system 
and vice versa, and any appreciation of the resilience of Indonesia’s financial 
system requires an assessment of its interactions with both East Asia’s and 
the global financial systems. 
Resilience “embraces change as a requisite to persist,”43 and it is 
different from the concept of robustness, which means the capacity of a 
system with one broad point of equilibrium to resist crisis and return to that 
point. In his 1973 paper, Holling differentiated between resilience and 
stability: 
[S]tability . . . represents the ability of a system to return to an 
equilibrium after a temporary disturbance; the more rapidly it returns 
and the less it fluctuates, the more stable it would be. But there is 
another property, termed resilience, that is a measure of the 
persistence of systems and of their ability to absorb change and 
disturbance and still maintain the same relationships between 
populations or state variables.44 
Stability has come to be denoted as robustness and this is an important 
differentiation in understanding resilience: robustness signifies “an ability to 
withstand shocks to the system,” whereas resilience means an ability to 
“adapt and reconfigure in response to them.”45 Robustness implies stability 
is built into the system given assumptions about the magnitude of potential 
shocks — as is currently the case with financial risk management. So a robust 
system will be one designed to withstand a once in 100-year event for 
example, an approach used in risk management. In contrast resilience makes 
no assumptions about the magnitude of possible shocks, but rather looks to 
 
 43  Folke et al., supra note 41, at 1. 
 44  Holling, supra note 23, at 14. 
 45  Marc Welsh, Resilience and Responsibility: Governing Uncertainty in a Complex World, 180 
GEOGRAPHICAL J. 15, 20 (2014). 
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build systems that can deal with the entire range of shocks, and fail safely if 
they must. 
Robustness has a static quality, whereas resilience is more dynamic.46 
Resilience is more open to the possibility of broad systemic change within 
defined parameters—that a system will have different potential equilibria and 
may cope with a shock by returning to a different equilibrium than before. 
Indeed, resilience stresses the importance of this flexibility as essential to 
system stability: it is this very capacity of the system to move from one point 
of equilibrium to another that is essential to its resilience. Resilience is 
therefore a view of a system as inherently heterogeneous and characterized 
by response diversity which enables the system to cope with shocks: “the 
stability of [social-ecological systems] is conceptualized as a moving 
baseline made up of multiple states rather than a static pit in which systems 
strive to remain.”47 
In this sense, regulating for resilience implies the need for regulations 
which maintain adaptive flexibility or adaptive governance. Applying such 
resilience thinking is challenging, not least because it is not entirely clear 
from regulatory documents which type of stability/robustness/resilience the 
current postcrisis regulatory reforms are aimed at. Do they aim to protect and 
underpin the status quo—on the basis that the current system is fit for purpose 
save for key defects which led to the global financial crisis—or is there a 
more fundamental agenda of reform that is necessary for global financial 
stability? What would a state of multiple equilibria look like in finance, and 
could regulation accommodate it? For example, it has been pointed out that 
bank runs are entirely rational48 and that they represent the system flipping 
from one equilibrium to another,49 and yet they are a classic example of the 
type of undesirable panic/crisis event that policymakers seek to prevent and 
that work on systemic stability attempts to prevent. Work is therefore needed 
 
 46  “Contrary to resilience, robustness does not include the ability to reorganize . . . and instead is seen 
as a (static) system property.” Roland W. Scholz, Yann B. Blumer & Fridolin S. Brand, Risk, 
Vulnerability, Robustness, and Resilience from a Decision-Theoretic Perspective, 15 J. RISK RES. 313, 
319 (2012). The terms are sometimes used interchangeably. See, e.g., Kambhu, Weidman & Krishnan, 
supra note 19 (using the term robustness to describe complex adaptive systems). 
 47  Muriel Cote & Andrea J. Nightingale, Resilience Thinking Meets Social Theory: Situating Social 
Change in Socio-Ecological Systems (SES) Research, 36 PROGRESS IN HUM. GEOGRAPHY 475, 478 
(2012). 
 48  As Mervyn King commented to Alistair Darling, British Chancellor of the Exchequer, during the 
run on Northern Rock in 2007: “They’re behaving perfectly rationally, you know.” HUGH PYM, INSIDE 
THE BANKING CRISIS: THE UNTOLD STORY 35 (2014). 
 49  The maturity transformation performed by banks creates multiple possible equilibria, and bank 
runs have been characterized as “an undesirable equilibrium” which can result from the illiquidity of 
assets and information asymmetries that characterize deposit-taking banking systems. Douglas W. 
Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity, 24 Q. REV. FED. RES. BANK 
MINNEAPOLIS 14, 15 (2000). 
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to determine what a multiple-equilibria regulatory model would look like. It 
would at least be helpful if regulators could clarify how they perceive 
resilience in the postcrisis reform agenda. What, for example, does the 
Financial Stability Board mean by stating that strengthened international 
regulation is “building more resilient financial institutions and more robust 
markets?”50 
Resilience thinking moves away from the simple equilibrium of 
classical economics and works instead from the premise of a system’s 
adaptive capacity for overall stability through multi-scalar internal 
instability, flexibility, and adaptability. Applying such thinking about 
resilience to finance therefore raises pointed questions about the suite of 
modern financial theories that underpin the markets, which have been 
constructed on the premise of a single equilibrium system.51 These theories 
broadly assume that economies and markets are stable and have a point of 
equilibrium to which the system will naturally tend but are periodically and 
only temporarily punctuated by disruption.52 This is typified by the Value at 
Risk approach to risk management, based on the Gaussian bell curve 
distribution of risk/returns which assumes that they are normally clustered 
around the mean. Tail risk then becomes an outlier in an otherwise relatively 
stable system. 
Rather than viewing the challenge of systemic risk through the 
assumption that markets efficiently and rationally price assets for financial 
stability in the normal course of events—and are only intermittently 
interrupted by cataclysmic crises which cannot be predicted from within the 
market’s own frame of reference—resilience would appear to require a 
cognitive approach that gives a central role to constant flux and 
disequilibrium across the markets, “[f]or what is resilience but the notion of 
disequilibrium as a general organising principle?”53 
From this perspective, the focus of system governance—and the 
management of episodes of disruption—should not necessarily be to return 
 
 50  Carney, supra note 16, at 1. 
 51  See, e.g., Robert C. Merton & Zyi Bodie, Design of Financial Systems: Towards a Synthesis of 
Function and Structure, 3 J. INV. MGMT. 1, 1–23 (2005) (discussing institutional design of financial 
architecture in light of frictionless neoclassical equilibrium and the rational behavior of agents); Olivier 
Blanchard, Where Danger Lurks, 51 FIN. & DEV. 28, 28–31 (2014). 
 52  For an overview of how modern financial theory contributed directly to the crisis and 
malfunctioning of the system, see, KEVIN DOWD & MARTIN O. HUTCHINSON, ALCHEMISTS OF LOSS: HOW 
MODERN FINANCE AND GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION CRASHED THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM (2010). As 
Haug & Taleb have commented: “theories about practice should arise from practice[] or at least avoid 
conflict with it. This explains our concern with the ‘scientific’ notion that practice should fit theory.” 
Espen Gaarder Haug & Nassim Nicholas Taleb, Option Traders Use (Very) Sophisticated Heuristics, 
Never the Black-Scholes-Merton Formula, 77 J. ECON. BEHAV. ORG. 97, 97 (2011).  
 53  Walker & Cooper, supra note 4, at 154. 
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the system to the pre-existing point of equilibrium (if a point of financial 
system equilibrium can indeed be identified) as is the case with current 
regulatory thinking. Resilience thinking in ecology requires the acceptance 
of notions of inherent instability and flux as the actions of agents continually 
evolve to reshape the dynamics of the system. It requires governance around 
dynamic flexibility because resilience depends on “diversity in norms, 
institutions, laws, incentive structures and behavioural practices. Market 
competition [in contrast] favors productivity but leads to diversity loss which 
cripples the system’s ability to adapt to change.”54 
 B. Hysteresis 
Another concept that is closely linked to the challenge of managing for 
dynamic flexibility around panarchy, or multiple equilibria, is the notion of 
hysteresis. Hysteresis in ecology refers to the energy changes within a system 
as it moves between equilibria, which can have a decisive effect on its 
recovery trajectory after shock. The recovery path of a system following a 
change in state can be very different from the path it took during the change 
in state because the energy required to return a system to its previous state 
may be much greater than the energy required to bring about the original 
change. Hysteresis means that as a system moves from point A to point B, it 
loses energy or the energy dynamics change such that it may not 
automatically shift back to point A: “[o]nce the system has shifted to a new 
stable equilibrium, simply removing the stress will not automatically produce 
recovery.”55 
Linking to the notion of panarchy, hysteresis in complex adaptive 
systems means that it cannot be assumed that the balance or particular 
configuration of the system prior to a stress event is in fact its natural state to 
which it will naturally return after a crisis, or to which the system should be 
returned with targeted postcrisis management. Hysteresis and panarchy stress 
the transient nature of systems: 
The study of scale effects demonstrates with great clarity that nature 
is dynamic, always changing at various scales of space and time. 
Ecologists study what appear to be discrete ecosystems often giving 
the appearance of being in equilibrium (i.e., “balanced”) but which 
are, in reality, small segments of a temporal and spatial 
 
 54  Simon Levin et al., Social-Ecological Systems as Complex Adaptive Systems: Modeling and Policy 
Implications, 18 ENV’T & DEV. ECON. 111, 126 (2013). 
 55  O’Neill, supra note 42, at 185. 
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continuum . . . .56 
The point of managing a system for resilience, then, may not be to return 
it to its original point of perceived balance but to accept that it may settle 
elsewhere postcrisis. As such, “the resilience perspective shifts policies from 
those that aspire to control change in systems assumed to be stable, to 
managing the capacity of social-ecological systems to cope with, adapt to, 
and shape change.”57 
Applying this to financial governance and regulatory reform would 
suggest a shift in conceptualizing the purpose of regulation beyond a focus 
on restoring market equilibrium to the precrisis situation. In the case of a 
bank run such as Northern Rock, for example, should the role of the regulator 
be to intervene to save what can be salvaged of the bank? Or should it be 
accepted that the system has shifted to a new equilibrium, and in doing so 
has lost energy (the reputation of the bank’s brand) such that efforts to return 
it to its former equilibrium as a functioning bank should not be pursued? 
Similar questions can be asked about policies to support particular markets 
and efforts to restore their functioning postcrisis. 
 C. Adaptive management around dynamic, interlocking systems 
Managing for resilience requires a fundamentally different approach to 
system governance than managing for stability around an assumed point of 
equilibrium. It requires dynamic management which aims to maintain 
flexibility in the system and scope for internal change—and to allow such 
organic change—rather than seeking to limit change and maintain the status 
quo on the basis that the underlying markets are efficient. It requires adaptive 
rather than static management which accepts and allows postcrisis adaptation 
in the system. Partly this stems from a need to accept the uncertain dynamic 
of “interactions between slow-moving and fast-moving processes and 
between processes that have large spatial reach and processes that are 
relatively localized.”58 Managing for systemic stability around only one scale 
or assumed point of equilibrium can have impacts on other interlocking 
scales or processes, which can in turn destabilize the system and undermine 
resilience. By managing for stability, resilience can be reduced: “[c]omplex 
systems that have artificially suppressed volatility tend to become extremely 
 
 56  KIRCHNER, supra note 24, at 109–10. 
 57  Carl Folke, Resilience: The Emergence of a Perspective for Social-Ecological Systems Analyses, 
16 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 253, 254 (2006) (citation omitted). 
 58  C. S. Holling, Lance H. Gunderson & Donald Ludwig, In Quest of a Theory of Adaptive Change, 
in PANARCHY: UNDERSTANDING TRANSFORMATION IN HUMAN AND NATURAL SYSTEMS (L. H. 
Gunderson & C. S. Holling eds., 2002) 3, 9.  
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fragile, while at the same time exhibiting no visible risks.”59 
Yet to date, financial regulation has focused almost exclusively on 
financial system stability by reducing volatility and strengthening the 
viability of financial institutions using prescriptive metrics for risk weighting 
of assets, capital adequacy, liquidity, etc. Key regulatory debates are framed 
almost entirely from this vantage point, without taking into account (i) the 
impact of financial system dynamics on other interlinked processes and 
systems which can create unanticipated feedback loops for financial system 
stability, or (ii) the unintended consequences of trying to manage for stability 
in a complex adaptive system. 
An example is the impact of the global asset bubble of 2005–2007 on 
localized political structures, which in turn created new systemic 
vulnerabilities. Management of the financial system in those years assumed 
the success of financial innovation and new trading opportunities. From the 
purely financial point of view from which financial stability work was then 
focused, this was underpinned by the lack of market shocks during that period 
and the rise in returns and profitability at financial institutions, both of which 
were taken as signs of health in the financial system. However, the global 
boom created severe economic stress across the world, raising the cost of 
living, as the growing trading in commodity derivatives created a global food 
crisis that triggered political unrest in several developing countries.60 
A threshold effect of this process could be seen in the events of 
December 2010 and after, when a Tunisian fruit seller immolated himself in 
protest at repressive police treatment and the stress that rising costs and 
disparities in growth were placing on his livelihood, sparking the first of the 
Arab revolts.61 Yet the consequences were the destabilization of financial 
markets globally. Multi-scalar effects are evident here: poverty, global 
development, and political reform are generally slow-moving processes that 
are managed separately from financial stability because they operate on a 
different scale and are institutionalized in different forums.62 However, their 
 
 59  Nassim Nicholas Taleb & Mark Blyth, The Black Swan of Cairo: How Suppressing Volatility 
Makes the World Less Predictable and More Dangerous, 90 FOREIGN AFF. 33, 33 (2011). 
 60  See Marco Lagi, Karla Z. Bertrand & Yaneer Bar-Yam, The Food Crisis and Political Instability 
in North Africa and the Middle East, NEW ENGLAND COMPLEX SYS. INST. (2011), 
http://necsi.edu/research/social/food_crises.pdf; Olivier De Schutter, Building Resilience: A Human 
Rights Framework for World Food and Nutrition Security, at 9, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/9/23 (Sept. 8, 2008). 
In April 2008 the United Nations created a High Level Task Force on the Global Food Security Crisis. 
See High Level Task Force on Global Food and Nutrition Security, UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un-
foodsecurity.org for details.  
 61  Mohamed A. El-Khawas, Tunisia’s Jasmine Revolution: Causes and Impact, MEDITERRANEAN 
Q., Fall 2012, at 23 (“The spark that ignited the uprising was not a cry for democracy but a demand for 
jobs.”). 
 62  As Jeffrey Sachs noted, “we have trillions of dollars directed at banks and bail-outs but we’re told 
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interdependencies create dynamic feedback loops that require integrative 
management strategies around flexibility that take into account multi-scalar 
effects and the possibility of transmission of vulnerabilities across different 
scales and different interlocking systems. Arguably, network 
interconnectivity such as this requires broader thinking around the real 
meaning of financial stability. It is not enough to simply embed country risk 
or political risk as a discrete category of the risk management framework so 
as to manage financial loss on a particular transaction or define risk limits for 
exposures. 
Resilience in this sense is a challenge to the limits of current thinking 
about the objectives of financial regulation, which focus purely on the 
dynamics of the financial system itself and outcomes for system participants. 
It fails to take into account the dynamics of symbiotically mutating systems 
which are all nonlinear and nested, i.e. embedded in each other. Systemic 
stability has been understood as an issue of business continuity at financial 
institutions (particularly for systemically important financial institutions) and 
stability across various financial markets. Drawing on resilience in social-
ecological systems science would indicate that to truly understand dynamic 
resilience in finance, it cannot be framed from such a limited point of view, 
particularly with globalized markets. Instead, it requires a perspective that 
captures financial system dynamics in interaction with multiple other 
dynamic systems: legal, political, ecological, cultural, institutional, etc. 
These are all in turn complex adaptive systems evolving at their own rate. 
Applying resilience thinking to finance therefore arguably requires a broad 
theoretical expansion far beyond the current technical limits of the financial 
stability debate to incorporate a more expansive cognitive map of the factors 
that ultimately impact upon financial system stability. It raises broad public 
policy questions around how we can or should define an optimal financial 
system, and in particular whether the expansion of global financial markets 
is an end in itself, even if it destabilizes other systems on which it ultimately 
depends. 
As persuasive as the idea of adaptive governance is, it is complex to 
apply as a management tool in finance because an adaptive system can 
inherently adapt to the properties of its own governance regime. The financial 
system does already display properties of such adaptive behavior, which can 
help pre-pave the conditions for the next crisis. Following the South East 
Asian crisis of 1997–1998, for example, the countries involved began 
 
there’s nothing for the poor. Meanwhile, we are teetering on the brink of collapse and violence in parts of 
the world where people have been pushed to the brink.”Harvey Morris, Forgotten Victims of the Global 
Downturn, FIN. TIMES (Mar. 10, 2009), https://www.ft.com/content/79556b02-0db3-11de-8ea3-
0000779fd2ac. 
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stockpiling foreign currency reserves and keeping their currencies low 
against the dollar to encourage exports. This was one factor that fueled global 
liquidity and global imbalances that in turn contributed to the global credit 
bubble.63 Although the South East Asian countries, as with many developing 
countries, were able to weather the storm of the crisis reasonably well, the 
currency imbalances helped stoke problems elsewhere, highlighting the 
interdependencies at different ranges and scales that have come about 
through integration of global markets. This raises the question: “Does the 
resilience of some livelihoods result in the vulnerability of others?”64 How 
should the system be managed to take into account these effects? If the 
system is managed purely around the stability and profitability of financial 
system participants, should the impact of financial flows on standards of 
living and global livelihoods be a matter for financial system regulation, or 
should it continue to be ancillary to regulatory mandates? Clearly, the way 
we define system resilience is as important as the way we manage for it. 
 D. Resilience and “efficient” markets 
Resilience and the notion of panarchy therefore offer a different 
cognitive paradigm for systemic risk analysis and questions of market 
stability than the current intellectual framework, and they raise pointed 
questions about the ideas that have dominated financial theory over previous 
decades: equilibrium, efficient markets, and the assumption of a normal 
(Gaussian) probability distribution of returns in which the whole spectrum of 
risks are calculable in a meaningful way.65 If markets are in constant flux and 
features of the system are dynamically shifting in unpredictable ways, does 
the theory that they efficiently price assets through the incorporation of all 
relevant information at any given point actually fit, or do we need to conceive 
of the system in radical new ways? Do pricing signals effectively convey the 
information necessary for market participants to make decisions that promote 
resilience? The fluidity of a complex adaptive and resilient system would 
imply that financial markets may not be characterized by the stability of the 
relationships between actors and risk factors that drive a market and that the 
efficient market hypothesis requires.66 Instead, markets are conceived as 
 
 63  Maurice Obstfeld & Kenneth Rogoff, Global Imbalances and the Financial Crisis: Products of 
Common Causes, FED. RESERVE BANK OF S.F. (Oct. 19, 2009), http://www.frbsf.org/economic-
research/files/Obstfeld_Rogoff.pdf. 
 64  Cote & Nightingale, supra note 47, at 482. 
 65  Esteban P. Caldentey & Matías Vernengo, Modern Finance, Methodology and the Global Crisis, 
52 REAL-WORLD ECON. REV. 69, 69–81 (2010). 
 66  Economists “might say ‘get the prices right’ without recognizing that price systems require a stable 
context where social and ecosystem processes behave ‘nicely’ in a mathematical sense (i.e., are continuous 
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dynamically nonlinear in functioning: 
Theories of complex systems portray systems not as deterministic, 
predictable and mechanistic, but as process-dependent organic ones 
with feedbacks among multiple scales that allow these systems to self-
organize . . . . The study of complex adaptive systems attempts to 
explain how complex structures and patterns of interaction can arise 
from disorder through simple but powerful rules that guide change.67 
If the markets are dynamically nonlinear and liable to flip from one 
equilibrium to another in unexpected ways, a wholesale rethink of the 
intellectual architecture of risk will arguably be necessary—from an 
assumption of calculable uncertainty to an acceptance of incalculable 
uncertainty.68 Nonlinearity, multiple equilibria and the dynamic uncertainty 
of constant change challenge the utility of reliance on probability and a 
normal distribution of returns as a baseline for risk management because it 
implies that the system is constantly shifting and mutating—that it is not 
amenable to a probability-type assessment. This raises the question whether 
risks can be meaningfully assessed and managed in a constantly changing 
system, or whether attempting to do this in a complex dynamic system pushes 
risk into the statistical tails, creating “silent risks [that] accumulate beneath 
the surface.”69 If risk cannot be meaningfully measured, this would call into 
question the current architecture of risk weighted capital adequacy, which 
requires a calculable distribution of risk which can be measured and hedged 
across the spectrum of asset classes. 
One major problem with the current regulatory approach to stability/
resilience in the financial markets, then, is that as it assumes inherent stability 
in the distribution of returns it systematically downplays the likelihood of tail 
risk events, which it cannot address from within its own framework.70 A 
resilience approach to risk management that accepts the nature of finance as 
a complex, nonlinear system would imply a need for a more dynamic model 
that focuses on the constantly shifting, dynamic interplay of system 
 
and convex) . . . without recognizing the surprises that nature and people inexorably and continuously 
generate.” PANARCHY: UNDERSTANDING TRANSFORMATIONS IN HUMAN AND NATURAL SYSTEMS, supra 
note 41, at xxi–xxii. 
 67  Folke, supra note 57, at 257 (citation omitted). 
 68  Nina Boy, J. Peter Burgess & Anna Leander, The Global Governance of Security and Finance: 
Introduction to the Special Issue, 42(2) SECURITY DIALOGUE 115, 115–122 (2011). This links into N. N. 
Taleb’s thinking on risk and randomness in financial markets. See NASSIM N. TALEB, FOOLED BY 
RANDOMNESS: THE HIDDEN ROLE OF CHANCE IN LIFE AND IN THE MARKETS (2nd ed., 2005); NASSIM N. 
TALEB, THE BLACK SWAN: THE IMPACT OF THE HIGHLY IMPROBABLE (2007). 
 69  Taleb & Blyth, supra note 59, at 33.  
 70  Kevin Dowd et al., How Unlucky is 25-Sigma?, 34(4) J. PORTFOLIO MGMT. 76, 76–80 (2008). 
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participants and factors that are constantly shaping the potential outcomes of 
the system in subtle ways. It would require a focus on the influence of 
different scales and different interacting systems on risk. It is inadequate to 
focus on market data as the primary vehicle for assessing risk, and outcomes 
for system participants alone. Risk then moves from being a calculable 
uncertainty to an incalculable uncertainty: 
A new epistemic condition of deep or radical uncertainty has come to 
dominate . . . because the increased interconnection and complexity of 
‘traffic’ and communication – be it financial in the form of credit 
channels, transport-based as in the aviation system, or biological as in 
the spread of pandemics – vastly increases exposure to rare events that 
exceed calculability and shatter existing provisions of crisis 
management and insurance.71 
Considering the dynamics of resilience within social-ecological systems 
indicates the need for a radical shift in thinking about risk in finance. This 
would need to move away from statistical modelling of market and economic 
data on the assumption of a reasonably stable distribution of returns to a 
framework that is more fluid, better able to aggregate risks across markets, 
and better able to understand the interplay of risk across different interlocking 
systems. 
Although a rethinking of risk around a deeper understanding of 
resilience is arguably essential, it is clearly problematic at the same time 
because it would require fundamental changes to the current cognitive 
architecture of risk. Recovery trajectories in complex systems are unique 
because the system is always evolving, and “the complexity of the system 
combined with unanticipated compounded effects can make recovery 
trajectories difficult or impossible to predict. The system may look similar 
but it is not the same system, because like any living system it is continuously 
developing.”72 Given the realities of today’s markets, a more fluid, less 
deterministic approach to risk management (whatever operational form that 
may take) may be far more useful than the statistical assumption of normal 
returns. The oversupply of global liquidity, the global hunt for yield by 
investors, the prevailing narratives of financial analysts, the dynamics of risk 
management and capital adequacy regulations, the existing monetary 
policies, and the size of the financial economy relative to the real economy 
are all factors internal to the financial markets that affect values, risks, and 
financial stability and raise questions over the efficient pricing of capital by 
market participants. As has been commented: 
 
 71  Boy et al., supra note 68, at 117. 
 72  Folke, supra note 57, at 257 (citation omitted). 
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Capital superabundance will increase the frequency, intensity, size 
and longevity of asset bubbles. The propensity for bubbles to form 
will be magnified as yield-hungry investors race to pour capital into 
assets that show the potential to generate superior returns. Because the 
global financial system has grown so large relative to the underlying 
economy, asset values can quickly reach unsustainable levels and 
remain inflated for months or years.73 
Developing a global risk architecture suited to this type of constant 
change and incalculable uncertainty, as well as the influence of resilience 
across multiple interlocking systems, must be part of a resilience agenda 
which can provide a meaningful way of managing systemic change. 
 E. Heterogeneity: building resilience on diversity 
A further factor that SES resilience thinking emphasizes is the essential 
heterogeneity of system participants and behavior as a crucial component of 
the capacity of systems to reorganize in the face of shocks. 
The simplest intuitive case contrasts a competitive system in 
homogeneous versus heterogenous space. . . . [H]omogeneity leads to 
a single equilibrium in which the dominant population eliminates all 
others. Heterogeneity, combined with limited dispersion, allows 
multiple competitors to coexist, each within a local cell. The result is 
that the total community, summed across the spatial heterogeneity, 
can have a number of stable states, depending on the heterogeneity.74 
This contrasts with the noted tendency of the international finance 
architecture and financial theories to produce homogenized behavior of 
system participants, even though the theories themselves fail to account for 
the homogenizing tendency on participant behavior of their widespread 
uptake.75 The standardization of global rules of financial regulation has also 
been argued to reduce systemic diversity by mandating the harmonization of 
procedures and management within financial institutions. As leading 
commentators warned over a decade ago about the proposed Basel II 
 
 73  Karen Harris, Andrew Schwedel & Austin Kim, A World Awash in Money, BAIN & COMPANY: 
INSIGHTS 4 (Nov. 14, 2012), http://www.bain.com/publications/articles/a-world-awash-in-money.aspx. 
 74  O’Neill, supra note 42, at 183 (citation omitted). 
 75  Homogenization has even been argued as strengthening the system: “When financial institutions 
become more homogenous, the need for inter-institutional risk sharing is lowered. Any imperfections such 
risk sharing may be subject to are hence mitigated. Moreover, institutions then need to rely less on such 
risk sharing, which reduces externalities among them. This, in turn, improves their incentives and lessens 
the need for regulating them.” Wolf Wagner, The Homogenization of the Financial System and Financial 
Crises, 17 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 330 (2008).  
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regulations: “Of special concern is how the proposed regulations would 
induce the harmonisation of investment decisions during crises with the 
consequence of destabilising rather than stabilising the global financial 
system.”76 
The homogenization of participant behavior is also exacerbated by the 
use of similar benchmarks for performance, and similar analytical and 
valuation techniques drawn from the same financial theories and narratives 
of market trends. As a result, financial behavior becomes highly correlated 
under stress, leading to one-way markets in response to shocks that 
destabilize financial structures and serve as a conduit for the transmission of 
problems from one market sector to another.77 Rather than the market 
mechanism serving to contain the forces of crisis by bringing heterogeneous 
buyers and sellers together, the standardization of practice through 
harmonized rules, theories, and benchmarks reinforces a crisis and 
exacerbates its global impact. 
The drive to standardize the regulation and governance of the system 
around what is perceived to be best practice and cutting edge financial theory, 
therefore, may lead to diminished systemic resilience. Efforts to build greater 
resilience must focus on fostering heterogeneity such that “competitive 
advantage shifts among species and never remains constant long enough to 
permit dominance or elimination.”78 Heterogeneity being essential to 
systemic resilience raises questions over the current approach of the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, which is pursuing a Regulatory 
Consistency Assessment Programme. This is based on the assumption that 
“[c]onsistent implementation of the Basel framework is fundamental in 
raising the resilience of the global banking system.”79 Yet the standardized 
international capital adequacy framework and risk models were identified 
during the crisis as having failed to build adequate reserves into the system.80 
How consistent implementation of the new framework will deliver resilience 
is not articulated, beyond the fact it will maintain “market confidence in 
regulatory ratios” and provide “a level playing field for internationally 
 
 76  JON DANIELSSON ET AL., AN ACADEMIC RESPONSE TO BASEL II: SPECIAL PAPER NO. 130 3 (2001), 
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/ca/fmg.pdf. 
 77  Charles Goodhart & Wolf Wagner, Regulators Should Encourage More Diversity in the Financial 
System, VOX (Apr. 12, 2012), http://www.voxeu.org/article/regulators-should-encourage-more-
diversity-financial-system; MARKUS BRUNNERMEIER ET AL., THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF 
FINANCIAL REGULATION: GENEVA REPORT ON THE WORLD ECONOMY NO. 11 (2009). 
 78  O’Neill, supra note 42, at 183. 
 79  BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, REGULATORY CONSISTENCY ASSESSMENT 
PROGRAMME (RCAP) – ANALYSIS OF RISK-WEIGHTED ASSETS FOR MARKET RISK 5 (2013). 
 80  See, e.g., JAMES ALEXANDER ET AL., VERDICT ON THE CRASH: CAUSES AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
(Philip Booth ed., 2009).  
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operating banks.”81 
The need for heterogeneity also raises the question of whether a system 
can be truly resilient when it is dominated by a cadre of TBTF financial 
institutions that benefit from substantial public guarantees that ensure their 
survival, despite the negative externalities they generate pursuing their own 
private gains. Arguably, this is inimical to systemic resilience: in multiple 
equilibria ecological systems “[l]ocal conditions change so rapidly that 
competitive advantage shifts among species and never remains constant long 
enough to permit dominance or elimination.”82 After the crisis, improving 
competition among the banking industry has been a theme of public policy 
debates, yet with the efforts to underpin banking giants in many countries 
and the special global regulation of systemically important financial 
institutions, the effects on competition are questionable.83 
TBTF financial institutions are justified on the basis of economies of 
scale. However, much recent research has questioned whether economies of 
scale in banking diminish beyond a certain size, and are offset by the 
management and governance problems created by greater institutional 
complexity and lack of transparency of risks.84 Furthermore, the global 
negative externalities TBTF banks generated during the crisis raise questions 
over whether further embedding the dominance of TBTF financial 
institutions through creating a targeted regulatory regime assists or 
undermines resilience. Given the strain on public sector balance sheets in the 
advanced economies, if the regulatory measures targeted at TBTF financial 
institutions fail, there is little scope for further public bailouts. Such 
institutions, therefore, pose critical ongoing risks to the health of the 
international financial system. It may well be that a thorough understanding 
of resilience in financial systems will establish that no system can be truly 
resilient if it contains institutions that are TBTF. 
One regulatory approach that could enhance systemic resilience is the 
 
 81  BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, supra note 79. 
 82  O’Neill, supra note 42, at 183. 
 83  BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, GLOBAL SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT BANKS: 
UPDATED ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY AND THE HIGHER LOSS ABSORBENCY REQUIREMENT (2013). 
Twenty-nine banks have currently been identified as systemically important banks. FIN. STABILITY BD., 
2013 UPDATE OF GROUP OF GLOBAL SYSTEMICALLY IMPORTANT BANKS (2013), 
http://www.fsb.org/2013/11/r_131111/.  
 84  Andrew G. Haldane, Exec. Dir. of Fin. Stability, Bank of Eng., Speech delivered at the Institute of 
Economic Affairs, London: On Being the Right Size (Oct. 25, 2012), 
http://www.bis.org/review/r121030d.pdf; Robert DeYoung, Scale Economies Are a Distraction, FED. 
RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS: THE REGION 14–16 (Sept. 2010); Arnoud W.A. Boot, Banking at the 
Crossroads: How to Deal With Marketability and Complexity, 1 REV. DEV. FIN. 167, 167–83 (2011); 
RONALD W. ANDERSON & KARIN JOEVEER, BANKERS AND BANK INVESTORS: RECONSIDERING THE 
ECONOMIES OF SCALE IN BANKING: DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 712 (2012), http://www.lse.ac.uk/ 
fmg/workingPapers/discussionPapers/fmgdps/dp712.pdf. 
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work to develop an effective and credible resolution regime for TBTF 
financial institutions—living wills.85 Living wills are designed to respond to 
the particular dominance of these institutions by building a process of 
bankruptcy or restructuring that will allow the institutions to be wound up in 
an orderly way without requiring public funds or destabilizing the markets. 
The fact that such companies require living wills indicates how far from 
resilient the system actually is, but if living wills can be successfully 
implemented, they will surely enhance the resilience of the financial system 
by expanding the capacity of markets for self-renewal in the face of shocks.86 
Living wills depend upon effectively anticipating the types of stress 
events that may occur and how they would impact an organization. If done 
well, stress testing will enhance financial institution resilience in the SES 
sense because it builds dynamic responsiveness to changing conditions into 
the heart of the organization. It can also build a capacity in the organization 
to anticipate and reconfigure in the face of market shocks, particularly if used 
effectively in terms of capital budgeting and risk appetite planning. However, 
translating a resolution procedure from theory to practice is far from easy 
given the complexity and opacity of these organizations. The next major 
crisis may teach us that living wills, while fine on paper, do little to limit 
contagion and corral systemic risk in an actual crisis. 
One segment of the financial markets that has displayed resilience in the 
ecological sense in recent years is the hedge fund industry.87 The collapse of 
Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) in 1998 is often used to illustrate 
the dangers of hedge funds. However, in practice, the dynamics of the sector 
are very different from that of the global banking industry: there is a very 
high attrition rate among funds that largely passes unnoticed, does not cause 
systemic ripples, and does not require taxpayer-funded bailouts. Even LTCM 
was bailed out by private sector financial institutions at the instigation of the 
Federal Reserve, rather than by an injection of public funds.88 According to 
 
 85  Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions, FIN. STABILITY BD. 
http://www.fsb.org/2014/10/r_141015/, (Oct. 15, 2014); Directive 2014/59/EU, of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 Establishing a Framework for the Recovery and Resolution 
of Credit Institutions and Investment Firms, 2014 O.J. (L 173); IMF, Cross-Border Bank Resolution: 
Recent Developments, Board Paper (June 2014). 
 86  Such living wills are difficult to translate from theory into workable plans given the scale and 
complexity of TBTF institutions and the cross-border issues involved. See Thomas M. Hoenig, Vice 
Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Statement: Credibility of the 2013 Living Wills Submitted by First 
Wave Filers (Aug. 5, 2014); Emilios Avgouleas, Charles Goodhart & Dirk Schoenmaker, Bank Resolution 
Plans as a Catalyst for Global Financial Reform, 9 J. FIN. STABILITY 210, 210–18 (2013); IMF, The Too-
Important-to-Fail Conundrum: Impossible to Ignore and Difficult to Resolve, Staff Discussion Note (May 
27, 2011). 
 87  Hedge funds are alternative investment funds that invest using bespoke, proprietary investment 
strategies to try to generate higher returns than those produced by standard asset managers. 
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a recent report, in the five years prior to 2014, half of all hedge funds were 
found to have closed, and the average life of a hedge fund that survived its 
first year of operation was just over five years.89 The UK’s Financial Conduct 
Authority has commented: “Hedge funds fail or close down on a regular basis 
without causing a significant impact on the financial system, but [the few] 
very large hedge funds potentially pose a risk.”90 It is noteworthy that the 
sector displays very different characteristics from the global banking 
industry. Hedge fund assets under management are roughly USD two 
trillion.91 In comparison, the top five largest banks in the world have over 
USD thirteen trillion in assets.92 The hedge fund industry is also characterized 
by many small funds, with nearly ninety percent of funds managing less than 
USD 500 million in assets.93 The sector operates on much higher leverage 
than the banking industry—average leverage was estimated at 130% in 2012, 
down from 150% in 2010—but is characterized by regular fund liquidations 
which do not impact market stability.94 As part of a resilience research 
agenda, further investigation of the relative dynamics of the banking and 
hedge fund sectors may prove fruitful. 
Such a study may shed light on the role of regulation in shaping market 
dynamics, for the latest crisis at least has been centered on highly regulated 
financial institutions.95 The failures of regulation and supervision have come 
in for heavy criticism following the crisis, and the postcrisis regulatory 
response has also been criticized as not going far enough. The response has 
been characterized as being insufficient to have prevented the latest crisis, let 
alone the next one.96 The dynamics of the regulatory and supervisory process 
as in itself a complex, adaptive system may need to be examined in light of 
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 89  Dan McCrum, Zombie hordes thrive, await further hedge fund corpses, FT ALPHAVILLE (Mar. 25, 
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hedge-fund-corpses/ (citing data from Hedge Fund Research).  
 90  FIN. CONDUCT AUTH., HEDGE FUND SURVEY: MARCH 2014 4 (2014). 
 91  THECITYUK, HEDGE FUNDS REPORT 2013, 1 (2013). 
 92  Maria Tor & Saad Sarfraz, Largest 100 Banks in the World, SNL (Dec. 23, 2013), 
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 96  Douglas W. Arner, Adaptation and Resilience in Global Financial Regulation, 89 N.C. L. REV. 
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a resilience research agenda, and the limits of what regulation may be able to 
achieve honestly assessed. As had been pointed out about the process of 
drafting the Basel framework: such international regulation is produced by a 
“highly politicized committee process[,] . . . [which is] the product of 
innumerable arbitrary decisions, irrational compromises, and political horse-
trades – not to mention the personalities and prejudices of the main 
participants involved.”97 
Adaptive governance of the complex adaptive financial system through 
the medium of a legal framework also therefore needs to take into account 
the complex, adaptive nature of the law: “The legal system comprises a 
multitude of institutions and actors interacting and evolving over time in 
ways that give rise to complex system dynamics. . . . [P]utting panarchy 
theory into practice will require adaptively managing the complex adaptive 
legal system to adaptively manage other complex adaptive natural and social 
systems.”98 
 F. Integrative resilience 
Analyzing resilience in finance therefore requires an agenda for 
defining systemic resilience at the outset, as well as an agenda for how 
characteristics of resilience can be fostered through legal and governance 
processes. This is a very tall order. At the level of the law, for example, 
financial regulation interacts with a range of other legal provisions such as 
property rights, contract law, corporate law, and international investment 
law, as well as with the political, institutional, and power structures of a given 
country. It also suffers from the fact that the organizational bureaucracies put 
in place to implement financial regulation can themselves become rigid and 
resistant to change over time, and subject to their own particular dynamics. 
The behavior of agents in various interacting processes and systems is 
then another essential component affecting the dynamics of the system and 
its ability to cope with shocks. Ecology theory quickly realized that the 
resilience of an ecological system could only be meaningfully understood 
and defined through reference to the interplay of ecological and human/social 
systems. The influence of human agency on an environment is so great that 
the ecology cannot be analyzed in isolation. Both systems were symbiotically 
undergoing dynamic changes, and resilience therefore embodies the notion 
of constant change of symbiotically mutating systems that nonetheless 
generate stability. The resilience of one system therefore draws upon the 
 
 97  K. DOWD & M. HUTCHINSON, ALCHEMISTS OF LOSS: HOW MODERN FINANCE AND GOVERNMENT 
INTERVENTION CRASHED THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM 290 (2010). 
 98  J. B. Ruhl, Panarchy and the Law, 17(3) ECOLOGY SOC’Y 31, 32 (2012). 
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resilience of other systems with which it is nested or interdependent. Could 
this mean that resilience in finance requires a far greater capacity to capture 
and respond to feedbacks from social, economic, political, and institutional 
dynamics than is currently the case? Such dynamics express the tapestry of 
power-relations in different societies and how this can affect financial system 
functioning. Due to the fragmentation of institutional, legal, and disciplinary 
boundaries, they are currently largely isolated from each other as areas for 
policy debate. Analyses of financial sector governance will typically ignore 
issues of political organizational development, local poverty and economic 
inequality, and ethical issues, but once resilience is defined from a broader 
frame of reference than simply the business continuity of financial 
institutions, they all become part of an agenda for resilience, particularly in 
a globalized world. 
A further relevant question, then, is the scale of observation from which 
we observe resilience of the financial sector. Is it purely a question of 
business continuity and viability under stress of financial market participants 
as regulation is currently drafted? Or in this globalized world is it also a 
question of the impact of dynamic financial processes on a whole range of 
other systems—ecological, political, and social, for example—which in turn 
shape the resilience and continuity of financial markets? Expanding inquiry 
to this scale to take into account interlocking dynamics of various systems 
will invariably raise normative questions of the functions of finance and the 
impact of its dynamics on local processes. If trading commodity derivatives 
generates profits for firms in New York, London, and Switzerland, but 
impacts livelihoods in Sub-Saharan Africa which in turn affects the resilience 
of their social and political structures, is this a question for the resilience of 
the financial architecture? If markets aren’t efficient allocators of capital, 
then what is their purpose and what should the resilience agenda aim to 
protect? Ultimately, a fundamental question that needs to be asked at the 
outset is: resilience of what and for whom? 
 V. AN AGENDA FOR FINANCIAL RESILIENCE 
Although this paper has merely skimmed the surface of what is a 
complex and ever-expanding debate in order to highlight some themes, we 
can now contrast eight different characteristics of a resilient system as 
defined in ecology with features of the modern financial system. The 
characteristics of a resilient system in a SES sense are: 
• Capacity to reorganize and persist in response to shocks, 
• Panarchy, 
• Hysteresis, 
• Adaptive governance and management processes, 
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• Dynamic interplay of resilience at different temporal and spatial 
scales, 
• Interlocking, nested complex adaptive systems, 
• Incalculable dynamic uncertainty, and 
• Heterogeneity. 
In contrast, the features that characterize the current approach to 
conceptualizing and regulating the financial system are: 
• Robustness/stability, 
• Frictionless equilibrium, 
• Static governance around a perceived single equilibrium, 
• Isolation of financial system stability as the single purpose of 
regulation, 
• Financial system stability assessed from the perspective of 
market dynamics, with impacts of the financial system on other 
systems largely ignored, 
• A calculable distribution of risk, only intermittently disrupted 
by tail risk events, and 
• Homogenization of system participants fostered by regulation, 
benchmarking and herding, heightening correlation in times of 
stress. 
These lists indicate a need to rethink our understanding of the nature of 
the financial system and its resilience, including what is meant by resilience 
in finance. Applying the notion of resilience as it has come to be understood 
in social-ecological systems science raises some fundamental questions 
about the prevailing architecture of financial theory, of financial regulation, 
of the management and governance of the system, as well as normative 
questions about the purpose of the financial markets and their impacts on 
other systems. A broader systems perspective on the interaction of finance 
with other interdependent systems raises the question whether we need in 
fact to rethink its boundaries as part of a study of the nature of financial 
resilience. If global financial markets are causing acute stress in the cost of 
living and destabilizing political regimes that in turn impact financial 
markets, should this be part of a broader debate on financial resilience even 
if it does not immediately impact the viability of financial institutions? How 
wide do we cast the net of resilience? The deepening of global financial 
markets has resulted in the growing interdependence of systems and an ever-
expanding influence of financial markets on other features of daily life. These 
can in turn symbiotically influence the performance of financial markets and 
cannot be excluded from a resilience framework. 
Once we have defined resilience, how then do we manage for it? The 
postcrisis regulatory architecture builds largely on the pre-existing 
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architecture rather than on radical rethinking.99 It aims to bolster the stability 
of key hubs of the system such as systemically important banks and insurers, 
or through central clearing for over-the-counter derivatives, or otherwise by 
addressing specific issues that were critical to the last crisis. This in no way 
guarantees systemic resilience going forward as the epidemiology of each 
crisis is unique, and this approach may, in the long run, exacerbate 
fragility.100 
It has become clear in ecology that designing a management system 
around a particular web of ecosystem diversity implies effectively imposing 
value judgements on the system as to which characteristics we wish to protect 
and help endure. The choice of management methodology in itself then 
affects the dynamics of the system. In application to finance, this raises 
theoretical questions around what we are managing resilience for, which 
strays into normative territory. Currently, the regulatory debate assumes that 
the current “efficient” financial system is the optimal one only if we can fix 
the failings that led to the last crisis—and hence we have an incremental 
approach to postcrisis regulation. But this approach is effectively loaded with 
a qualitative judgement on what functions the financial system is meant to 
serve and which features are optimal from a particular worldview. When 
deconstructed in light of alternative equilibrium states of the system, this is 
fraught with value judgements that only take into account a limited range of 
socio-economic impacts, and which prioritize maintaining the status quo for 
financial entities as the optimal outcome of a regulatory regime. A broader 
analysis of resilience dynamics requires that this normative judgement be 
placed at the forefront of redesigning an architecture of financial resilience. 
 VI. CONCLUSION 
Resilience is a fashionable concept that is currently being applied in a 
variety of disciplines, and which has frequently been used in debates on 
financial regulatory reform since the crisis. Current use of the term resilience 
in regulatory pronouncements appears to be based on an assumption that 
resilience is another word for financial stability, and that postcrisis changes 
which improve the current framework to address the specific failings that led 
to the latest crisis are sufficient to build resilient financial markets. However, 
resilience is a much deeper and more complex concept than this, and work 
in social-ecological systems science has identified key features of resilience 
 
 99  Ross. P. Buckley, The Changing Nature of Banking and Why It Matters, in RECONCEPTUALISING 
GLOBAL FINANCE AND ITS REGULATION (R. P. Buckley, E. Avgouleas & D. Arner eds., 2016). 
 100 Folke et al., supra note 41, at 4 (“there is a danger in becoming too focused on specified resilience 
because increasing resilience of particular parts of a system to specific disturbances may cause the system 
to lose resilience in other ways.”). 
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in complex adaptive systems that allow systems to persist and renew in the 
face of disturbance. Applying those features to the characteristics of the 
contemporary financial system and the regulatory agenda indicates that there 
is a need for a much more comprehensive debate on what we mean by a 
resilient financial system, and who or what should be resilient. 
Most often today, when financial regulatory agencies speak of 
resilience, they mean robustness, and it is not clear that anyone really knows 
what a truly resilient global financial system would look like. It is usually 
taken as a given today that the objective of regulation is the viability and 
business continuity of financial entities, but this presupposes key aspects of 
resilience which do not necessarily hold true in complex, dynamic, nonlinear 
systems. Building resilience in the global financial architecture may require 
a broader perspective that builds upon notions of multiple equilibria, 
incalculable uncertainty, the dynamic heterogeneity of system participants, 
and the importance of the interaction of resilience in multiple interacting 
systems for the resilience of the financial system. Drawing on resilience as it 
is defined in ecology would therefore require a cognitive shift in perceptions 
of resilience in the financial markets towards a more dynamic, multivariate 
concept of the system which in turn calls for a re-envisioning of the system 
and its governance. 
 
